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ABSTRACT
A significant amount of concern exists in popular and political culture concerning
the effects of trade liberalization on the domestic economy in the U.S. Difficulty exists
in isolating the effects of a particular trade agreement due to unrelated trade policy
changes that happen preceding, during, and following the signing of an agreement. This
research seeks to do an analysis of the big picture involving consumption, income, and
employment not with the intent of determining causation, which has proven highly
problematic in previous research; instead, the focus is on whether we can exclude a
negative effect by NAFTA on these measures of economic well-being in the U.S.

ix

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The effects of trade agreements have been, are being, and will likely continue to
be a hotly debated topic in national popular culture and in political circles. The
theoretical and empirical effects of free trade are well accepted by those in the economics
discipline and the basic fundamentals of comparative advantage have been effectively
restated many times. However, the difficulty in applying this accepted view of trade to
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is that, while
NAFTA incorporates components of free trade, it preserves at its core a very protectionist
trade foundation, albeit one which expands the protectionism to a regional area.
This maintenance of a protectionist posture in NAFTA causes any assumption of
free trade effectiveness for economic growth to evaporate and introduces contention to
the discussion of trade agreements. We can observe similar dynamics in the present day
discussion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement being debated
nationally at this time. Beyond the fact the precise terms of the agreement are being
shielded from public consumption and the argument about fast-track authority for the
Obama administration (a mostly political battle), we can see similar for/against “battle
lines” forming as those which took place with NAFTA.
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Proponents of the trade agreement laud the potential for growth in trade and
expansion of U.S. marketplaces as trading partners experience the economic growth that
free(r) trade generally entails. Opponents of TPP focus their attacks on the agreement
around the impending loss of jobs, national sovereignty, and a decline in economic
standing that will inevitably (their words) result from the U.S. facing increased
competition abroad; particularly in countries that have lower labor standards, lower
wages, and less business regulation. There are fundamental problems with both
arguments that are rather relevant to a discussion and analysis of NAFTA: 1) in
reference to the proponents of NAFTA (and TPP), preferential trade agreements do not
necessarily share strict comparative advantage characteristics with free trade, and 2)
regarding opponents of the trade agreements, comparative advantage can reduce (or
eliminate) inefficiencies and make the workforce more productive in the long run leading
to growth in the job market overall.
While free trade may be easier to measure, preferential trade agreements have
many more moving parts that make measurement difficult and frustrate attempts to
explain correlation, much less lend themselves to causation. McDaniel and Agama
(2003) stated it rather succinctly when they wrote that “NAFTA is not a particularly clean
policy to assess” (p. 939). McDaniel and Agama (2003) point out that trade liberalization
in Mexico had begun well before NAFTA and add that other “events that confound the
identification of the effects of NAFTA include the establishment of the World Trade
Organization and its associated agreements in 1995” (p. 939).
Additionally, the lack of immediacy that is inherent in the political process further
complicates attempts at empirical analysis. The cliché “an act of Congress” is rooted in
2

reality, thus the process by which government(s) enacts trade regulation is problematic
for any snapshot analysis. The slow nature of trade policy negotiation had other impacts
on the calculable effects of NAFTA in that in anticipation of a trade agreement, the
nations involved began independently taking steps to reduce tariffs, etc.; and, companies
began shifting resources and production prior to the agreement being officially approved.
That being said, part of this paper’s analysis is an attempt to isolate before- and
after-effects of independent variables in regressions on consumption, income, and
employment. This was in hope of gaining insight into whether causation of any
“negative” domestic effects of NAFTA could be excluded. The attempt is not necessarily
to perfectly explain those three dependent variables, but instead to see the shifting
explanatory significance of a fixed set of relevant independent variables on the respective
dependent variables.
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CHAPTER II
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
As mentioned above, comparative advantage does not necessarily exist in
preferential trade agreements as it does in free trade structures. This is an uncomfortable
reality for the proponents of regional trading agreements as steps toward free trade. In
fact, due to rules of origin (ROO) provisions in NAFTA, there is evidence of a shift away
(potentially) from a broader access to advantaged production than what may have existed
prior to NAFTA. For example, Krueger (2000) extensively addresses the conflict
between trade creation and trade diversion within NAFTA when she asks: “can we use
trade data to identify shifts of production to locations with comparative advantage within
NAFTA and shifts from low-cost producers in the rest of the world to higher cost
producers in the NAFTA countries” (p. 769)? The question in itself illustrates a possible
negative effect of NAFTA for a movement towards a more globalized free trade
structure; which is whether NAFTA’s attempt to increase trade regionally may serve to
reduce some free trade effects through de facto tariff imposition if producers with a true
comparative advantage are utilized. This speaks to the difficulty in characterizing
NAFTA as a free trade agreement and analyzing it as such.
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It would seem reasonable, then, that NAFTA could increase employment in the
NAFTA countries and have limited effects (or potentially negative ones) on consumption
due to increased base costs of goods as producers shift inward to shield from relatively
higher tariffs driven by ROO. Krueger (2000) hesitantly concludes that the expansion of
trade amongst NAFTA partners, particularly Mexico and the U.S., was due largely to
trade creation rather than diversion (p. 774). However, it is important to note that, in
Krueger’s (2000) analysis, loss in value due to diversion was less likely due to the
devaluation of 1994 in Mexican currency (Krueger, 2000, p. 773).
This idea that NAFTA (and similar agreements) are merely expanded
protectionism inspires another question, which is why would producers change a
preference from state level of industry protection to a regional one? The instinctive
response would be the rise of the multinational corporations that would be capable of
taking advantage of a controlled expansion in trade. Chase (2003) supports and expands
on this premise with two arguments:
First, producers support trading blocs when access to the regional market
enables them to take advantage of economies of scale. Firms producing
goods with steep cost curves seek regional arrangements because
increased production for an enlarged market yields significant reduction in
unit costs…Second, producers supporting trading blocs when an
integrated regional market enables them to move stages of production
across borders. Because barriers to regional trade and investment restrict
opportunities to take advantage of differences in wages, skills, or capital
costs, firms seek arrangements if they can redeploy intermediate
production between labor-rich and labor-scarce areas (pp. 141-142).
This establishes a basis of support for such a regionally isolated trading agreement and
tends the NAFTA argument more toward protectionism than to liberalization. In fact,
Chase (2003) largely argues that lobbying activities can be linked to this ability to scale
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production and indicates that the policy was, at least to some extent, driven by the desire
to merely move the barriers to entry rather than removing them (p. 168). While the
existence of large scale lobbying efforts might seem to imply a presumption of negative
overall effects, the two are not necessarily related.
Employment loss versus a shift in employment
Opponents of free trade agreements in a highly developed country like the U.S.
generally have a central argument against liberalization of trade which is employment.
However, this is a very short-run perspective that requires a lack of foresight and can
disproportionately weight present-day interests at the expense of future growth.
Comparative advantage, by definition, implies an increase in efficiency; sometimes that
efficiency manifests itself in increased labor outputs or a better use of capital which
opens up future investment.
This touches on the heart of the free trade principles that were incorporated into
NAFTA. For instance, in the auto industry the trend toward assembly in Mexico had
been taking place before NAFTA; however, component production began to shift back
into the U.S. to comply with ROO. While the ROO is fundamentally protectionist, the
division of production across national borders is based somewhat on (regional)
advantage. The more capital intensive production of (certain) components found its way
to the country with a high ratio of capital to labor, while the labor intensive assembly
process increased the speed iat which the process migrated towards the south.
Therefore, it is reasonable that inefficiencies that would have existed more so in
the absence of trade would be reduced, making more capital available for investment in
6

both countries. This is the classic factor endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin) theory of trade
versus autarky example in a two-nation model. Of course, not only does the ROO have a
driving effect from the rest of the world (ROW) into the region, but it also limits the
likelihood that too much of this production would just come from one (or a group of)
developing country(s) outside of the region into Mexico exclusively. Once again, the
numerous moving parts of NAFTA’s regulatory underpinning make it difficult to
quantify the nature of production shifts and labor demand.
Francis and Zheng (2011), however, did an analysis of state level data and
concluded that “the demand elasticity of NAFTA shows that NAFTA increased labor
demand by .27%” and they predicted NAFTA then had and would continue to have a
“small but positive effect on U.S. labor demand” (p. 1666). Francis and Zheng (2011)
also concluded that growth in state level unemployment reduced by 4.4% annually due to
NAFTA (p. 1669).
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CHAPTER III
TRADE IMBALANCES: PROTECTIONISM AND GROWTH
While the political rhetoric that surrounds trade agreements such as NAFTA and
TPP generally have a “sky is falling” for the American worker tenor to it, the literature
review clearly illustrates a different (more empirical) result consistent with well-accepted
economic theory on trade. Protectionism, while certainly alluring to the general public
(and thus politicians), has costs; however, these costs are defrayed and possibly
remediated when expanded to a regional position. This appears most likely in a
circumstance where advanced countries can partner with a developing country and gain,
to some extent, from the growth of the developed country. Increases in buying power in
the developed country can be strategically controlled by the advanced country(s) to
increase its own exports while still benefitting from some level of gains from
comparative advantage.
The reason I believe this to be an appealing move (politically) in modern times is
the belief that the shift toward a new equilibrium in production can be controlled. The
traditional fear of free trade is not that goods will be too affordable, but that no one would
be able to afford them after “all the jobs” have moved overseas. Whether or not this fear
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is rational is irrelevant; however, that this fear is so pervasive presses policy makers to
obscure the intentions of trade agreements in incrementally expanding trade. While the
long term effectiveness of these policies in achieving free trade could be argued, it seems
regional agreements serve as political cover for expanding global trade for some.
Furthermore, with the disparity in political, religious, and philosophical positions
globally, the idea of a large scale global free trade pact is untenable to even consider,
much less pursue. There is little hope of effectively expanding simplified free trade, as
well as too much focus on economics as political soft-power to ever imagine a fluid
trading arrangement worldwide.
The case for protectionism
Importantly, however, there is a significant portion of the population that believes
protectionism serves a positive economic interest. It is this belief that may help further
this incremental expansion of trade. For example, Gomory and Baumol (2011) make the
argument that the shift in American production from a higher ratio of manufacturing to a
greater level of services is untenable in the long run (p. 688). In fact, their argument is
inherently anti-comparative advantage and they appear to view the relationship between
goods and services as antagonistic in the long run. They attempt to bolster this view that
having an economy based on innovation and technology is insufficient for long run
growth by stating:
Americans remain large-scale consumers of manufactured goods—from
automobiles, to television sets and computers, to machines of every sort.
If we do not make these products ourselves, we must trade for them.
However, since most trade—and, notably, most of America’s imbalance in
trade—is in manufactured goods, we are unlikely to be able to shift our
negative balance toward a surplus solely by increasing our positive trade
9

balance in services.
Thus, without improving its manufacturing
performance, Americans eventually will have to curtail their consumption
of manufactured goods sharply or else continue to go deeper into debt with
America’s trading partners—especially China. This process surely will
not be allowed to go on indefinitely (Gomory & Baumol, 2011, p. 688).
Beyond this statement being rather regressive in its position, it has another
significant major flaw. This statement prefaces a call by the authors to begin subsidizing
manufacturing or institute an export/import credit trading scheme to reduce the levels of
imports relative to exports (Gomory & Baumol, 2011, p. 689). Ultimately, the authors
call for reducing domestic consumption of manufactured goods in the present term
(which would be the most likely result of either of the two policies they suggest) in the
hopes of avoiding having to reduce the consumption of these goods in some future
period. A future period the authors can neither predict in real terms nor quantify the
imbalance necessary to facilitate the need for such a reduction.
This is the central complication to the success of protectionist trade policy, either
domestically or within a region. The policy requires fear of some unknown (and,
arguably unseen) calamity as the basis for restricting comparative advantage and
rejecting the idea that countries engaging in free trade are very likely to ultimately gain
from this trade. Gomory and Baumol (2011) seem to prescribe a treatment for an ailment
for which there is no evidence. Is this assessment meant to imply Pareto optimality in
free trade? Certainly not; however, the assumption that large scale distortions in the
market due to protectionism will actually have no more negative effects on the economy
while “saving” those who would be hurt by trade liberalization is speculative and
unsubstantiated at the very least.
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Of course, from a policy standpoint, opposition to free trade is a very powerful
force that crosses traditional political lines, making for some very interesting bed follows.
This was the case during NAFTA’s passing and is clearly apparent as the TPP debate
continues to heat up. The common thread among these different groups which generally
are in opposition to one another is that more liberalized trade will “hurt the American
worker” with no real acknowledgement of what positive effects may be realized in
increased consumption or freed up capital for expanding domestic production of goods or
ability to trade in services. While there are significant complexities that create noise that
interrupts any empirical analysis, this complexity is, in part, a result of the information
asymmetry inherent in the political process that leads to difficulties in policy
development and execution. These considerations are important as we look a NAFTA
going forward in this research paper.
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CHAPTER IV
THE DATA
The variables being used as proxy indicators of economic gain or loss due to
adoption of NAFTA were chosen based on their being the central argument of those who
assert negative effects of enhanced trade liberalization. First, I began with the level of
employment (emprate) which is found by subtracting the civilian unemployment rate
(unrate) from 100 to provide the level of the population who wish to work that are
employed over the sample period (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). The second
variable of interest is consumption (consum) which is the measure of real personal
consumption (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). Finally, I consider income
(income) which is real income excluding transfer receipts (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2015).
Some might argue that the employment rate without the consideration of labor
participation rates might be misleading; however, my findings in labor participation can
be observed in Figure 1 where clearly the participation rate fluctuates, but it does so with
a slight upward trend. Additionally, we can observe that in no way does participation dip
directly following passage of NAFTA. Instead, it is much more realistic that
participation began a descent due to the wealth created during the “tech boom” of the late
1990’s and continued due to factors associated with the recession that followed that
boom. This continued until a leveling out of participation came at the peak of the
housing boom and the more precipitous fall occurred during the Great Recession for a
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large variety of reasons. Ultimately, labor participation shows no graphical evidence of a
drop due to NAFTA’s passage.
Figure 1: Employment and Labor Participation

The biggest problem encountered with these variables was the high level of
correlation (0.9973) between consumption and income, due largely to the diminishing
rate of savings over time and the high likelihood that as people earn more they tend to
consume more. Figure 2, part a clearly illustrates this high level of correlation in the
trend of these variables. Looking at Figure 2, part b the graph illustrates the movement of
the employment rate over the same period. We can observe in Figure 2, part b that the
level of employment does experience significant fluctuation; however it is largely
stationary with a very slight upward trend. In Figure 2, part b, the first period of 1994 is
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marked to indicate the adoption of NAFTA; although, admittedly, the execution of
NAFTA was anything but swift.
Figure 2: a) Consumption and Income and b) Employment Rate

With respect to Figure 2, part a, at no time is either consumption or income used
as an explanatory variable of the other; the problem is mostly that of redundancy.
Therefore, to help reduce redundancy, consumption was utilized most frequently in the
initial analysis and income was used simply to check results to make certain that the
conclusions carried through consistently to income as well as consumption levels.
However, while there is a great level of correlation, I found the effects of the independent
variables on consumption and income vary in important ways which will be addressed
below.
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Selection of independent variables and regressing U.S. employment
The next step was to find a set of independent variables which could be used both
as explanatory variables for the dependent variables while also serving as NAFTA
performance variables. For example, in all regressions, a set of export and import
variables were used as explanatory variables. These included U.S. exports to Canada and
Mexico and imports into the U.S. from Mexico and Canada. This approach developed
out of the desire to measure the shifting significance (if any existed) of the most
fundamental trade indicators from the period before NAFTA and the period following its
passage.
The intent was to craft regressions that contained independent variables likely to
show a shift in real terms due to NAFTA (import/export variables) along with
independent variables unlikely to shift significantly due to the agreement as a way to
tether the regressions and lend stability. Additionally, as might be expected in macrolevel data, there was a stochastic trend that needed to be remedied. To accomplish this
many of the macro-level variables were transformed using first differencing (which will
be indicated with in the equations with a “d.”).
The first set of regressions used the employment rate (emprate) as the dependent
variable and I decided the best fit and applicability to NAFTA incorporated the
independent variables U.S. imports from Mexico (imp_mex), U.S. exports to Mexico
(exp_mex), U.S. imports from Canada (imp_can), U.S. exports to Canada (exp_can), U.S.
GDP (gdp), U.S. inflation (cpi), the Fed Funds rate (fedfunds), and the monetary base of
the U.S. (monbase).
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𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑑. 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2 𝑑. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽3 𝑑. 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽4 𝑑. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛
+ 𝛽5 𝑑. 𝑐𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽7 𝑑. 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝜖
The model yielded some interesting results when the impact on employment was
regressed before the passage of NAFTA and after.
I first employed a regression covering the ten years prior to NAFTA to capture a
period where the fundamental economic environment was relatively fixed.

Second, a

regression of the ten year period following NAFTA’s passage was performed. Finally,
the “after” regression was expanded using data from NAFTA’s passage through the final
quarter of 2014. This approach was conceived to attempt to isolate near term effects
from long term ones; keeping in mind that the short term was relative due to significant
variation in implementation. The results, in Table 1, show how a shift in significance did
not occur outside of CPI which would not likely be attributed to NAFTA.
It seems important to first identify which variables did not change in their
significance, although a change in magnitude of the effect was evident. U.S. GDP and
the Fed Funds Rate maintained consistency in their effect on the dependent variable
emprate. However, it is notable that in the near term (19947-2003) the effect of CPI on
employment exhibits a reduction in significance from the 1% level to having no
significance. This muting of the effect of CPI does not appear to have been temporary
and no return in significance or magnitude is observed in the longer term sample. Theory
would suggest that the change in CPI’s effect on employment was likely unrelated to
NAFTA and would logically be attributed to the economic (tech) boom that dominated
following NAFTA. Another important observation is that the monetary base had no
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significant effect in either the period before NAFTA or in the long run; however, there is
a small level of significance in the short-run. This would seem to indicate that the growth
in significance might be attributed to an unrelated economic development.
Table 1: Employment Rate Before and After NAFTA

Exports to Mexico
d.exp_mex
Imports from Mexico
d.imp_mex
Exports to Canada
d.exp_can
Imports from Canada
d.imp_can
Inflation
d.cpi
Monetary Base
d.monbase
GDP
d.gdp
Fed Funds Rate
fedfunds
_cons
N
R-sq

Before
1985-1994

Short Run
1994-2003

Long Run
1994-2015

0.00
(0.75)
-0.00
(-1.32)
0.00
(0.49)
0.00
(0.08)
0.76***
(3.27)
0.02
(1.04)
0.00
(0.95)
0.23***
(4.75)
90.95***
(209.36)
35
0.67

-0.00
(-0.40)
0.00
(0.67)
-0.00
(-0.36)
0.00
(0.11)
0.06
(0.16)
0.00*
(1.72)
0.00
(0.22)
0.24**
(2.70)
93.57***
(187.70)
36
0.37

-0.00
(-0.20)
0.00
(0.51)
-0.00
(-0.19)
-0.00
(-0.05)
0.14
(0.61)
0.00
(1.47)
0.00
(0.20)
0.25***
(4.86)
93.53***
(241.12)
44
0.43

t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

The variables which pertain most directly to NAFTA and were the focus of this
analysis did not see any profound shifts. First, U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada in the
period before NAFTA had a positive, yet insignificant, effect on employment. This
circumstance appears to have reversed in sign following the adoption of the trade
17

agreement without any change in significance level. Additionally, imports from Mexico
and Canada exhibit no increase in significance and what appears to be a minor change in
magnitude. Seeing that none of these variables had significance before or after NAFTA
indicates no foundational shift in the employment rate took place due to the agreement.
This would seem support the idea that NAFTA was not the mass job killer it was often
accused of being, nor could the agreement claim responsibility for any significant
increase in labor demand in the U.S.
Independent variable selection and regressing U.S. consumption and income
The same methodology was applied to the analysis of U.S. consumption and the
effects of NAFTA, but the variable selection was slightly different in an effort to capture
a stable model for consumption (and income) throughout the sample period. A “perfect”
forecasting model was not required, but a solid model incorporating the four trade
variables for the NAFTA partners was important. As mentioned previously, the high
level of correlation between consumption and income caused the focus of analysis to shift
more singularly (initially) to consumption while income’s use as a dependent variable
was initially isolated to use as confirmation of results. Interestingly, while a high level of
correlation exists between income and consumption, some very important disparities
emerged in the regressions.
The independent variables utilized in this second set of regressions differed
somewhat from the regressions on employment rate, but I kept the variables the same for
both consumption and income. This was not done at random; instead, this consistency
was maintained so that the two dependent variables (consumption and income) could be
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compared, before and after, in very specific terms. Additionally, the high level of
correlation allowed the fit of the regressions to be similar while the effects of the
individual variables on each dependent variable could be looked at separately. The two
equations for the respective regressions are below.


𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3 𝑑. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4 𝑑. 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑥 +
𝛽5 𝑑. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝑑. 𝑐𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑑. 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝜖



𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑝𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3 𝑑. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4 𝑑. 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑥 +
𝛽5 𝑑. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽6 𝑑. 𝑐𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑑. 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝜖

The variables used (in addition to the import/export variables) are: labpar being the labor
participation rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015), emprate which is the rate of
employment, cpi which is the rate of inflation (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015),
and monbase which is the monetary base ( Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015).
Again, due to the presence of unit root, many of the variables were transformed by using
the first difference.
It was expected that the effects of variables such as employment rate, labor
participation rate, inflation, and the monetary base would likely stay consistent in the
time period before and after NAFTA for both income and consumption. This was not
necessarily true in all cases, though. For example, in Table 2, we can observe that the
effect of the employment rate on consumption was insignificant in the period before and
directly following NAFTA, while the in the long-run the effect exhibited significance at
the 5% level. The magnitude of the coefficient of employment rate was growing,
however, which may indicate a slow rise toward significance due to NAFTA. It must
also be kept in mind that consideration of the effects of employment rate and labor
participation with respect to NAFTA must be cautiously interpreted considering the
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extraordinary economic growth that took place in the 10 years following the agreement.
For example, it would be consistent from a theoretical perspective that the tech boom of
the late nineties would likely have influenced changes in magnitude and significance in
those two variables, as would have the Great Recession that occurred much later.
The changes in the levels of significance and the magnitude of the coefficient of
CPI on consumption and income are also more likely the tech boom effect showing up in
the regression. Furthermore, we can observe that no real fundamental changes in the
effect of changes in the monetary base on either of the dependent variables in question.
Ultimately, these four variables would appear to stay relatively constant with respect to
NAFTA considerations.
Results of the effect of the import/export variables were rather interesting. First,
exports to Mexico were insignificant prior to NAFTA with respect to consumption and
income; however, in the period directly following NAFTA the effect became highly
significant with respect to consumption and moderately significant in their long-run
effects on income. This would seem to indicate that exports to Mexico had a positive
effect on income and consumption due to NAFTA.
Imports from Canada had a similar result which included a shift from a negative
(insignificant) effect on consumption prior to NAFTA to a positive one with significant at
the 10% level which grew to 5% in the long-run. Additionally, the effect of imports from
Canada had growing significance with respect to income in the short-run period. This
would seem to indicate that, while the magnitude of trade between the U.S. and Canada
was not extraordinary, the efficiency of this trade may have improved substantially.
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labpar

emprate
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t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

N
R-sq

d.exp_mex
Imports from Mexico
d.imp_mex
Exports to Canada
d.exp_can
Imports from Canada
d.imp_can
Inflation
d.cpi
Monetary Base
d.monbase
_cons

Exports to Mexico

Labor Participation

Employment Rate

35
0.34

36
0.54

44
0.42

35
0.39

Table 2: Consumption and Income Before and After NAFTA
D.consum
D.consum
D.consum
D.income
Before
Short
Long
Before
1985-1994
1994-2003
1994-2015
1985-1994
3.99
12.82
18.15**
16.65*
(0.51)
(1.24)
(2.14)
(1.90)
5.94
20.07
-18.95
-4.26
(0.51)
(0.70)
(-1.18)
(-0.33)
0.04
0.04***
0.04***
0.07
(0.70)
(2.82)
(3.07)
(1.12)
0.10*
-0.01
-0.02
0.05
(1.78)
(-0.81)
(-1.18)
(0.81)
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02**
-0.03
(-0.32)
(-1.41)
(-2.25)
(-1.28)
-0.03
0.02*
0.03**
0.02
(-1.48)
(1.82)
(2.40)
(0.94)
-43.54**
-25.20**
-18.80*
-48.46**
(-2.71)
(-2.15)
(-1.85)
(-2.72)
-0.99
-0.01
0.00
-0.69
(-1.06)
(-0.20)
(0.15)
(-0.66)
-670.28
-2469.30*
-371.30
-1186.23
(-0.64)
(-1.96)
(-0.53)
(-1.02)
36
0.47

D.income
Short
1994-2003
-12.41
(-0.61)
150.01**
(2.68)
0.03
(1.01)
-0.03
(-0.84)
-0.03
(-1.42)
0.04*
(1.85)
6.70
(0.29)
-0.09
(-1.22)
-8785.68***
(-3.56)
44
0.31

D.income
Long
1994-2015
25.69
(1.53)
-1.75
(-0.06)
0.05**
(2.03)
-0.02
(-0.45)
-0.01
(-0.45)
0.02
(1.06)
-11.46
(-0.57)
-0.03
(-0.46)
-2243.51
(-1.62)

Table 2: Consumption and Income Before and After NAFTA

Of course, not all of the results were positive in this analysis. In fact, imports
from Mexico shifted from having a positive and significant (at the 10% level) effect on
consumption to having a negative and insignificant effect. The effect of Mexican imports
on income experience the same sign shift; however, there was no significance either
before or after NAFTA. While we can observe a negative relationship between Mexican
imports and consumption it is certainly not of a cataclysmic scale. This negative effect is
important; however, it would certainly not seem to imply that NAFTA led to any large
scale loss of consumption or income; particularly when coupled with some of the positive
effects from the previously discussed import/export variables. Additionally, it must be
considered that this result may indicate a loss of comparative advantage globally if shifts
of production from outside the region into Mexico were based on protectionist measures
and not the value of the goods involved.
The final import/export variable to be addressed is exports to Canada. There was
relative consistency in the magnitude of the coefficient and in the sign of the coefficients.
However, we can observe that there was no significance either before NAFTA or in the
short-run regression following the agreement. The only significance was in the long-run
effect of exports to Canada with respect to consumption. This could certainly indicate a
steady reduction in exports to Canada following NAFTA that resulted ultimately in a
negative economic result. This would not necessarily be a surprising result considering
what might be expected when two developed countries enhance trade relations with a
developing nation. Theory would suggest that early gains might be captured
disproportionately by the developing country and not between the two advanced
economies. Considering NAFTA had some very protracted implementation, the long-run
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regression does not necessarily cover such a long period. This may be why some of the
import/export results are rather delayed in significance.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
While measuring effects from NAFTA have proven very problematic from a
causal perspective, it does seem that the ability to reject negative effects of the trade
agreement is reasonable. This paper sought to identify whether the direct effects of shifts
in trading patterns among NAFTA countries might be discounted as having a negative
influence on U.S. employment, consumption, and income. While the difficulty is in the
magnitude of the effects that can be attributed to NAFTA; it would seem relatively clear
that no large scale negative effects on the U.S. economy took place.
The fact that real income continued its trend and consumption continued to
increase would also appear to indicate graphically (in Figure 3) that if NAFTA had a
negative effect on these indicators of economic well-being and individual well-being it is
well concealed from view. Furthermore, any argument framed from the perspective that
NAFTA was negative although all indicators and empirical results indicate the opposite
would be a normative one indeed. While it remains clearly difficult to indicate causation
for increases, it appears fair that effects due to NAFTA are unlikely and, if anything,
ambiguous.
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Figure 3: Labor Participation, Employment Rate, Income, and Consumption

This research does not prove NAFTA to be a “good” policy, nor did it set out to
do so; however, it certainly gives evidence that NAFTA was not the end of economic
growth in the U.S. This result seems relatively clear even amidst all the economic noise
that surrounded that period in time. The problem that exists going forward is that
regardless of analysis of NAFTA, little insight will be provided with respect to future
trade deals (i.e. TPP) because of the considerable disparity that exists among many of the
complex agreements, particularly when greater numbers of countries are included. It is
reasonable to assume that increased trade liberalization will continue to prove the
relevance of comparative advantage, but the amount of liberalization will have to be
measured on an agreement-by-agreement basis. One thing does seem clear on policies
similar to NAFTA, that the nature of these expanded protectionist agreements will largely

25

be muted and the U.S. will continue to benefit from expanded trade relations, even if only
slightly. This seems to be true both in the short run and in the long run.
A question that occurred and would be interesting for future research on NAFTA
would be to analyze its effect on the tech boom that followed in the latter part of the
1990s. It seems realistic that increases in efficiency in U.S. industrial sectors may have
created an environment ripe for a growth in innovation and freed up the capital to do
endeavor such a growth.
Additionally, some valuable insights might be found by incorporating exchange
rate considerations into this research. If significance exists due to monetary value
considerations, we may gain more insight into how aggregate level import/export actually
effect employment, income, and consumption. Furthermore, executing analysis on
Mexico and Canada may have some interesting insights and clarify whether these results
are consistent through the region or whether the results are being driven by outside
factors. One thing is certain; the debate on trade (at least politically) will continue to rage
on regardless of empiricism due to the fear and expediency of free trade as an antagonist
to the U.S. economy.
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APPENDIX
Correlation Table
ln Inc
ln Cons ln CPI
ln GDP ln Base lnExpMex lnImpMexlnExpCan lnImpCan LabPar EmpRate
ln Income
1.0000
ln Consumption
0.9958 1.0000
ln CPI
0.9648 0.9750 1.0000
ln GDP
0.9965 0.9985 0.9803 1.0000
ln Monetary Base
0.9587 0.9651 0.9042 0.9535 1.0000
ln Exp. Mexico
0.9602 0.9604 0.9873 0.9707 0.8807 1.0000
ln Imp. Mexico
0.9855 0.9853 0.9804 0.9907 0.9203 0.9777 1.0000
ln Exp. Canada
0.9418 0.9419 0.9726 0.9553 0.8423 0.9802 0.9676 1.0000
ln Imp. Canada
0.9800 0.9802 0.9745 0.9860 0.9167 0.9732 0.9946 0.9722 1.0000
Labor Participation
0.6210 0.5935 0.6839 0.6284 0.4182 0.7407 0.6620 0.7725 0.6565 1.0000
Employment Rate
0.6354 0.5826 0.5353 0.6067 0.4805 0.5969 0.6296 0.6571 0.6395 0.7052 1.0000

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
ln Income
9.0141094
0.2272031
ln Consumption
8.941094
0.2602468
ln CPI
5.122324
0.2344044
ln GDP
9.36382
0.2333931
ln Monetary Base
6.938077
0.6948695
ln Exp. Mexico
8.687161
0.8504628
ln Imp. Mexico
8.913109
0.9093217
ln Exp. Canada
9.407725
0.5431052
ln Imp. Canada
9.585922
0.5401521
Labor Participation
65.86555
1.132901
Employment Rate
93.86975
1.482643
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Max
8.60067
8.40961
4.675004
8.927699
6.111024
6.900428
7.248646
8.149659
8.584272
62.8
90.1

9.340631
9.316464
5.470353
9.698595
8.312037
9.921951
10.13256
10.21047
10.33947
67.3
96.1
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